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This paper examines the Taylor rule in ﬁve emerging economies, namely Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Thailand,
and Turkey. In particular, it investigates whether monetary policy in these countries can be more accurately
described by (i) an augmented rule including the exchange rate, as well as (ii) a nonlinear threshold speciﬁcation
(estimated using GMM), instead of a baseline linear rule. The results suggest that the reaction of monetary au-
thorities to deviations from target of either the inﬂation or the output gap differs in terms of the size and/or
statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients in the high and low inﬂation regimes in all countries. In particular, the
exchange rate has an impact in the former but not in the latter regime. Overall, an augmented nonlinear Taylor
rule appears to capture more accurately the behaviour of monetary authorities in these countries.1. Introduction
The low level of inﬂation achieved in recent decades in the developed
world is often seen as the result of the adoption of policy rules by inde-
pendent central banks. Taylor (1993) showed howmonetary policy in the
US during the 1980s and the early 1990s could indeed be described in
terms of a clearly speciﬁed rule. Later studies (e.g., Clarida et al., 1998;
Svensson, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Ball, 2000; Shortland and Stasavage,
2004; Ghatak and Moore, 2011) extended the original linear Taylor rule
and emphasised possible nonlinearities in the reaction function of central
banks (e.g., Taylor and Davradakis, 2006; Martin and Milas, 2013;
Caglayan et al., 2016). These can arise either from nonlinear macro-
economic relationships (see Robert-Nobay and Peel, 2003; Dolado et al.,
2005, among others) or from asymmetric preferences or objectives of
policymakers (see Favero et al., 2000; Taylor and Davradakis, 2006;
Surico, 2007; Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2008; Castro, 2011; Martin and
Milas, 2004, 2013; Ahmad, 2016).
Several recent empirical studies have provided evidence ofanta Mallick) and two anonymous re
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10.1016/j.econmod.2018.02.0nonlinearities and threshold effects in the reaction of monetary author-
ities to inﬂation and output gaps (see Favero et al., 2000, Taylor and
Davradakis, 2006; Surico, 2007; Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2008; Cas-
tro, 2011; Martin and Milas, 2004, 2013; Ahmad, 2016, among others).
However, only a few papers have addressed this issue in the case of
developing and emerging economies (see Hasanov and Omay, 2008;
Akyürek et al., 2011; Miles and Schreyer, 2012; Akdogan, 2015; Hol-
tem€oller and Mallick, 2016).
The present study aims to ﬁll this gap in the literature by estimating a
threshold nonlinear Taylor rule in ﬁve inﬂation targeting (IT) emerging
countries (Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Thailand, and Turkey); moreover, an
augmented rule including the exchange rate is considered. Markov
regime switching models have often been estimated to capture non-
linearities in monetary policy rules (Bae et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2015;
Gonzalez-Astudillo, 2014). However, these have been criticised for not
allowing a smooth transition between regimes (Castro, 2011), unlike
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) and Smooth Transition Autoregressive
(STAR) models in which the regime change is driven by past values of theferees for their useful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this manuscript.
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Therefore in this paper we estimate a TAR speciﬁcation which is
ideally suited to capturing asymmetries in the behaviour of monetary
policy authorities, unlike Markov regime switching models that treat
regime changes as exogenous (since they are driven by an unobservable
state variable - Atanasova, 2003; Balke, 2000; Castro, 2011). Moreover,
this model allows to estimate the optimal threshold value of inﬂation in
each country. The estimation method is the generalised method of mo-
ments (GMM), which has the advantage of taking into account the
possible correlation between the regressors and the error term that could
give rise to endogeneity problems.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on the Taylor rule. Section 3 outlines the econometric model and dis-
cusses the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 offers
some concluding remarks.
2. Literature review
Since the 1990s, several central banks around the world have adopted
an inﬂation targeting framework (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). This is
thought to have several advantages, namely: (1) to lead to more inde-
pendent central banks; (2) to reduce inﬂation, making monetary policy
more credible; (3) to decrease uncertainty about the expected level of
inﬂation; and (4) to improve communication between policy-makers and
the public, making monetary policy more transparent (Bernanke and
Mishkin, 1997; Svensson, 2000; Gemayel et al., 2011). However, under
this framework a lower inﬂation rate might be achieved at the cost of
lower output and higher unemployment in comparison to other monetary
regimes (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997).
Taylor (1993, 1999) argued that the monetary policy of the Fed can
broadly be described by an interest rate rule based on the deviations of
output and inﬂation from target (see also Orphanides, 2002). The
adoption of such a rule appears to have had a signiﬁcant impact on
economic performance in the US (Bernanke, 2004; Siegfried, 2010;
Taylor, 2013a). Clarida et al. (1998) investigated the so-called Taylor
rule in two sets of countries, i.e., the G3 (Germany, Japan and the USA)
and the E3 (UK, France and Italy). They found that monetary authorities
in the G3 adjusted the real interest rate in response to inﬂationary
pressures following a forward-looking rather than a backward-looking
rule, whilst in the E3 other central banks followed the German Bundes-
bank very closely. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) concluded that monetary
policy in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) area was well
described by a Taylor rule, and Stuart (1996) reached the same conclu-
sion for the UK. Co^te et al. (2004) reported that none of their estimated
seven simple Taylor rules for the Canadian economy was robust to model
uncertainty.
Svensson (2003) argued that central banks should announce and
follow a simple instrument rule (see also Judd and Rudebusch, 1998;
McCallum, 1999; Taylor, 2000; Rudebusch, 2002). However, a number
of papers have criticised the Taylor rule arguing that following it me-
chanically is undesirable (e.g., Ball, 2000; Svensson, 1999, 2003;
McCallum and Nelson, 1999; Carlson, 2007; and Martin and Milas, 2013,
among others). For example, the Federal Reserve cut the interest rate
sharply during the stock market crash in 1987, the Asian crisis in
1997–98 (Carlson, 2007) and the recent global ﬁnancial crisis. Similarly,
the Bank of England reduced the interest rate from 5% in 2008 to 0.5% in
March 2009 - the biggest cut since its creation in 1694 (Astley et al.,
2009). Policy makers might need to adjust the rule when new informa-
tion arrives (Taylor, 2000; Woodford, 2001). For instance, Martin and
Milas (2013) pointed out that the Bank of England abandoned its mon-
etary rule during the recent ﬁnancial crisis with the aim of achieving
ﬁnancial stability. Taylor (2013b) suggested that deviations from the
Taylor rule might be due to international spillovers.
Other issues raised in the literature include the accurate estimation of
potential output (MacCallum and Nelson, 1999) and data uncertainty
with real time as opposed to ex-post data (Orphanides and Van Norden,22002; Hatipoglu and Alper, 2008). Under-forecasting or over-forecasting
the output gap might lead to inappropriate policy actions (Orphanides,
2002). The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter is the most commonly used
method because of its ﬂexibility (Cerra and Saxena, 2000), but it has
various disadvantages. The ﬁrst is that the most recent observations
suffer from a lack of accuracy (Shortland and Stasavage, 2004). The
second is the possibility of misspeciﬁcation of the underlying economic
structure since the suggested values of the ﬁlter are speciﬁc to US data
(Sarikaya et al., 2005). The third is the fact that output is more volatile in
the case of the emerging economies; therefore, the estimation of trend
output suffers from wider variation (Hatipoglu and Alper, 2008).
Another criticism of the baseline Taylor rule is that it does not allow
the central bank to smooth interest rate movements (Goodfriend, 1991),
whilst a smoothing parameter in the reaction function might be impor-
tant to achieve credibility as well as to avoid any capital market
disruption (McCallum, 1999; Levin et al., 1999 and Clarida et al., 2000,
among others).
2.1. The augmented Taylor rule
The baseline Taylor rule might also be inappropriate for open econ-
omies subject to external shocks (Svensson, 2000, 2003); in this case it
might be necessary instead to include other variables such as the ex-
change rate (see, Ball, 2000; Svensson, 2000, 2003; Obstfeld and Rogoff,
2000; Leitemo and S€oderstr€om, 2005; Ostry et al., 2012; Galimberti, and
Moura, 2013, Ghosh et al., 2016, among others). Taylor (2001), Edwards
(2007) and Mishkin (2007) conclude that this is in fact not required in
the case of the developed economies; however, it might be in the
emerging countries.
Ball (1999) had shown that following a monetary policy rule
including the exchange rate instead of the original Taylor rule results in a
lower variance of the consumer price index (CPI). Debelle (1999) also
argued that the unpredictability of output and inﬂation is reduced in this
way. Ball (1999) concluded that such an augmented rule was followed in
Canada from 1975 to 2003, whilst Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) found
that it was in the UK as well as Canada, but not in Australia and New
Zealand. Moreover, Taylor (2000) argued that a ﬂexible exchange rate
combined with a policy rule based on inﬂation targeting is the only sound
monetary policy for developing and emerging economies. A ﬂoating
exchange regime was instrumental to achieving low and stable inﬂation
in such countries according to Masson et al. (1997). However, this con-
ventional wisdom is increasingly being questioned (Ghosh et al., 2016).
The exchange rate pass-through can be signiﬁcant and should also be
considered (Svensson, 2000; Goldberg and Campa, 2010): it may force
central banks targeting price stability to tighten their monetary policy, or
lead to a competitiveness loss (Gagnon and Ihrig, 2004; Baily, 2003;
Bailliu and Fujii, 2004; Ghosh et al., 2016).
In addition, Daude et al. (2016) pointed out that central banks in
emerging markets with a ﬂexible exchange rate regime frequently
intervene in their foreign exchangemarket: they have an implicit comfort
zone for smoothing exchange rate ﬂuctuations, even if they do not specify
an exchange rate target (see also Ghosh et al., 2016; de la Torre et al.,
2013; Mohanty, 2013). Gali and Monacelli (2005), Adolfson et al.
(2008), and Caglayan et al. (2016) also found that the behaviour of
central banks is affected by exchange rate movements using dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Garcia et al. (2011)
concluded that including the exchange rate in the linear Taylor rule does
not provide any signiﬁcant gain for developed countries, but it does in
the case of emerging economies. Shortland and Stasavage (2004) showed
that the central bank for West African Economic and Monetary Union
(BCEAO) considered the foreign exchange position in addition to the
inﬂation rate and the output gap in setting its monetary policy rule. Filosa
(2001) also reported that central banks reacted strongly to exchange rate
movements in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, Chile and
Mexico. Further, Mallick and Sousa (2012) estimated a B-SVAR model
including the exchange rate and found that the domestic currency
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the intervention of the central bank in the forex market reduces the de-
gree of persistence in the appreciation of the exchange rate.1
Mohanty and Klau (2005) and Aizenman et al. (2011) provided
further evidence that central banks in emerging economies with IT
(implicitly) take into account exchange rate movements in the conduct of
monetary policy. Some authors (e.g., Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Galim-
berti and Moura, 2013; Catalan-Herrera, 2016) argue that the adoption
of IT in the emerging countries does not stop them from intervening in
the foreign exchange market (for instance, in the case of Israel – see
Brenner and Sokoler, 2010). Yilmazkuday (2008) found that the central
bank of Hungary only reacts to exchange rate movements, while those of
Poland and the Czech Republic seem to respond to deviations of output
and inﬂation from their targets in setting their interest rate. Further,
Granville and Mallick (2010) argued that the Bank of Russia failed to
achieve sustained low inﬂation because of its exchange rate targeting
policy.
Finally, Shrestha and Semmler (2015) estimated a simple linear
Taylor rule using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model in ﬁve
East Asian countries (Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and
Philippines), and concluded that the baseline Taylor rule is not sufﬁcient
to describe monetary policy in emerging countries and should be
amended to take into account ﬁnancial instability. More recently, Ghosh
et al. (2016) also provided evidence of foreign exchange intervention
which is consistent with achieving price stability under inﬂation target-
ing in the emerging countries.
2.2. The nonlinear Taylor rule
A further important issue is whether the reaction function of central
banks might be characterised by nonlinearities reﬂecting either the
structure of the economy (Robert-Nobay and Peel, 2003; Dolado et al.,
2005, among others) or their own asymmetric preferences (see, Favero
et al., 2000, Taylor and Davradakis, 2006; Surico, 2007; Cukierman
and Muscatelli, 2008; Castro, 2011; Martin and Milas, 2004, 2013). For
instance, policy responses might be different depending on the phase of
the cycle, with output stabilisation being given more importance dur-
ing recessions and inﬂation being instead the main concern during
expansions (Cukierman and Gerlach, 2003; Ahmad, 2016). Dolado
et al. (2000) found that the central banks of Spain, France and Ger-
many are less responsive to inﬂation when it is below as opposed to
above target. Taylor and Davradakis (2006) suggested that the Bank of
England sets interest rates following a nonlinear Taylor rule, despite its
symmetric inﬂation target. Martin and Milas (2013) also found
empirical support for a nonlinear Taylor rule in the UK during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis.
However, much less evidence on nonlinear Taylor rules is available
for the developing and emerging countries. Moura and de Carvalho
(2010) examined the conduct of monetary policy in seven Latin American
countries. Their ﬁndings suggest asymmetric responses to inﬂation,
output and exchange rate in Brazil, Chile andMexico. Hasanov and Omay
(2008) investigated possible asymmetries over the business cycles using
monthly data spanning the period 1990:01–2000:10. They estimated a
threshold Taylor rule using GMM where the output gap is the transition
variable, and found that the Central Bank of Turkey reacts more strongly
to output movements during recessions than expansions. Moreover, it
responds to foreign reserves, real exchange rates and short-term capital
inﬂows both in expansion and recession periods, and to money growth,
budget deﬁcits, and net foreign assets only in expansion periods. Akyürek
et al. (2011) also examined inﬂation targeting in Turkey by estimating
both linear and nonlinear Taylor rules (using a rolling method for the
latter) over the period 1999:07–2008:07; they found that a Taylor rule1 Their sample includes ﬁve key emerging market economies: Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa.
3including the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate captures accu-
rately the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Turkey.
Miles and Schreyer (2012), on the other hand, examined the reaction
functions of the central banks of four Asian countries, namely Thailand,
Malaysia, Korea and Indonesia using quantile regression analysis. They
found evidence of nonlinearities but some cross-country differences. For
instance, monetary authorities in Indonesia do not respond to the output
gap in the lower quantiles (0.2 and 0.4), while the central bank of Korea
responds to it in both the lower and higher quantiles. Further, only the
central banks of Malaysia and Indonesia react to exchange rate ﬂuctua-
tions. Jawadi et al. (2014) estimated a smooth transition regression
(STR) model to test for nonlinearity of monetary policy rules in China and
Brazil. They found that the real effective exchange rate is one of the
major drivers of the adjustments in the interest rate in both countries.
Finally, Akdogan (2015) found evidence of asymmetric behaviour of
monetary policy in nineteen inﬂation-targeting countries including
Thailand, Turkey and Israel using an Asymmetric Exponential Smooth
Transition Autoregressive (AESTAR) model. The estimated nonlinear
Taylor rule was found to predict well out of sample.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. The linear Taylor rule
Taylor (1993) suggested the following monetary policy rule for the
US Fed:
rt ¼ pt þ 0:5yt þ 0:5ðpt  2Þ þ 2; (1)
where rt is the Federal funds rate, pt is the rate of inﬂation over the
previous four quarters and yt is the percentage deviation of real GDP from
target. This implies that the policy interest rate goes up if inﬂation in-
creases above the 2% target or if real GDP rises above trend GDP. Taylor
(1998) modiﬁed this rule by adding two extra variables, namely the
central bank's target inﬂation rate ðπ*Þ and estimate of the equilibrium
real rate of interest ðrft Þ as shown below:
rt ¼ πt þ gyt þ h

πt  π*
þ rft ; (2)
where πt is the inﬂation rate. This simple formulation has been criticised
for not taking into account the effects of the exchange rate on monetary
policy, which have been considered by later studies, e.g., Ball (1999),
Svensson (2000), Taylor (1999) and Ghosh et al. (2016). The augmented
Taylor rule can be written as:
it ¼ fπt þ gyt þ h0et þ h1et1; (3)
where it is the short-term nominal interest rate and et is the real exchange
rate. No intercept in this equation implies that the targeted inﬂation rate
is zero and interest rates and exchange rates are measured relative to
their long-run values (Taylor, 2001).
In the present study, we ﬁrst estimate the following linear Taylor rule
using GMM as in Clarida et al. (1998, 2000),
rt ¼ α0 þ α1rt1 þ α2
X3
k¼1
ðEt1πtþk  πtÞ þ α3
X3
k¼1
ðEt1ytþkÞ
þ α4
X3
k¼1
ðEt1rertþkÞ þ εt; (4)
where rt is the short-term interest rate, πtþk is the CPI inﬂation, πt is the
inﬂation target and ytþk is the output gap calculated as the difference
between the log of output from its potential, and rertþk is real effective
exchange rate. It is assumed that policy makers respond to forecasts of
inﬂation, the output gap and the exchange rate over the coming quarter,
therefore a 3-month lead average is used for these variables in the esti-
mation (Svensson, 1997; Martin and Milas, 2013; Ahmad, 2016).
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Given the mounting evidence of possible nonlinearities in the reac-
tion function of central banks, we also estimate a threshold model
speciﬁed as follows (see following Taylor and Davradakis, 2006; Martin
and Milas, 2013; Caglayan et al., 2016):rt ¼ I

πt1  π*
 "
βH0 þ βH1 rt1 þ βH2
X3
k¼1
ðEt1πtþk  πtÞ þ βH3
X3
k¼1
ðEt1ytþkÞ þ βH4
X3
k¼1
ðEt1rertþkÞ
#
þIπt1 < π*
"
βL0 þ βL1rt1 þ βL2
X3
k¼1
ðEt1πtþk  πtÞ þ βL3
X3
k¼1
ðEt1ytþkÞ þ βL4
X3
k¼1
ðEt1rertþkÞ
#
þ εt:
(5)The threshold variable is the inﬂation rate, since central banks might
respond more aggressively when inﬂation overshoots than when it un-
dershoots its target (Akdogan, 2015); speciﬁcally, we use the ﬁrst lag of
inﬂation, πt1.2 π* is the optimal threshold value of inﬂation deﬁning the
high/low inﬂation regime of the model, and is estimated endogenously
along with the other parameters (Martin and Milas, 2013). I½⋅ is the
dummy indicator function that equals 1 when πt1  π*, and 0 other-
wise. Therefore, the monetary policy responses are driven by the optimal
threshold value of πt1.
In the above regression, the optimal threshold value of inﬂation, π, is
estimated along with the other parameters by minimising an appropriate
criterion function using a one-dimension grid search including the
possible breakpoints of inﬂation. Following Taylor and Davradakis
(2006), we use the GMM estimator given the possible correlation be-
tween the regressors and the error term. The criterion function that the
GMM minimises is given by
J ¼ bε0ZW1Z 0bε0; (6)
where bε0 is the estimated disturbance vector and Z is a vector of l
instrumental variables satisfying the orthogonality condition EðZ0εÞ ¼ 0.
This condition will generally not hold exactly in sample for estimated
values of ε, but the GMM estimator minimises a weighted average of the
squared values of the l sample moments Z0bε. In a linear context a two-step
procedure can be followed to construct the weight matrixW based on the
centred estimates of the moment conditions (see e.g., Hansen, 2016).
For a threshold model along with the other parameters a one-
dimensional grid search is conducted over the interval Π* including the
possible breakpoint of πt1 [0.10, 0.90]:
bπ* ¼ arg⋅minπ12Π* ⋅J; (7)
where J is the function minimised by GMM, as explained in Eq. (6)
(Taylor and Davradakis, 2006).3.3. Data
We estimate both the linear and threshold Taylor rule using GMM in
ﬁve emerging markets, namely Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Thailand,
and Turkey, all of which have adopted IT and a ﬂoating exchange rate2 We also consider from zero to two lags of inﬂation as possible alternative
threshold variables. The most signiﬁcant threshold effect (associated with the
highest value of chi-squared statistics of the threshold nonlinearity test) is ob-
tained when the models are estimated with the ﬁrst lag of inﬂation. The results
of the test are available upon request from the corresponding author.
4regime, and have similar development levels. A detailed description of
the variables used is given in Table A1 in Appendix A. Output is proxied
by the industrial production index (IPI) except in the case of Indonesia,
where this series is not available and the manufacturing index is used
instead. The output gap, ytþk, is calculated as the proportional deviation
of the 3-month leading average of the log IPI from its Hodrick andPrescott (1997) trend.3 The CPI is used to calculate the inﬂation rate,
πt1, and its 3-month leading average, πtþk; the inﬂation gap is con-
structed as the difference between πtþk and the inﬂation rate target, πt .
Further, the real effective exchange rate, rertþk, is the 3-month leading
average of the natural log of the real effective exchange rate. These data
were retrieved from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS)
while the inﬂation target, πt , is obtained from the websites of the central
banks of the countries under investigation. All series are seasonally
adjusted. The frequency is monthly and the sample period corresponds
to the actual adoption of inﬂation targeting by the ﬁve countries
examined: January 2001–November 2014 for Indonesia; June 1997–Feb
2015 for Israel; January 1998–March 2015 for South Korea; May
2000–September 2015 for Thailand; and January 2006–2015
September for Turkey.
Figs. 1–4 contain plots of the variables. Changes in policy rates are
evident in all countries in our sample. There are also noticeable de-
viations of inﬂation and output from target, with low volatility of inﬂa-
tion gap in Turkey over the recent years; the real effective exchange rate
is highly volatile in all countries, but considerably less in South Korea
since the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
To examine the stochastic properties of the series under consider-
ation, a battery of standard and nonlinear unit root tests were carried
out. The ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988),
and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) test results (see Table 1) imply that
all variables are stationary in levels, except the policy rate in Indonesia,
Israel and Thailand and the real effective exchange rate in Israel and
Thailand. The order of integration of interest rates, in particular, is a
contentious issue. Nelson and Plosser (1982) characterised them as a
nonstationary variable. Although Clarida et al. (2000) could not reject
the unit root null for the nominal interest rate, they pointed out that
such a variable should be considered stationary according to many
theoretical models. Martin and Milas (2004, 2013) and Castro (2011)
found that the order of integration of both interest rates and inﬂation is
ambiguous, but decided to treat them as stationary, as we do in the
current paper as well.
Visual inspection of the series (see Figs. 1–4) suggests that structural
breaks might have occurred; for example, the recent ﬁnancial crisis of
2007–8 appears to have had a signiﬁcant impact on the policy rates (see
Fig. 1) as well as the real effective exchange rates (see Fig. 3). As shown
by Perron (1989), structural breaks reduce the power of standard unit
root tests. Therefore, we also performed two unit root tests allowing for
up to m unknown breaks, namely the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997)3 Although the HP ﬁlter has some disadvantages, we have chosen it because of
its ﬂexibility in tracking trend output (Konuki, 2010) and followed Ravn and
Uhlig (2002) in setting the adjustment parameter equal to 14400.
Fig. 1. The evolution of policy rates.
Fig. 2. The evolution of inﬂation gaps.
G.M. Caporale et al. Economic Modelling xxx (2017) 1–14(thereafter LP) and Lee and Strazicich (2003) (thereafter LS) ones.4 At
least one of these two tests (see Table 2) rejects the null hypothesis of a4 By contrast, the tests of Perron (1989), Zivot and Andrews (1992) and
Banerjee et al. (1992) only allow for a single break.
5unit root, for the series found nonstationary using the standard unit root
tests, at either the 5% or the 10% level. The break dates mainly corre-
spond to the 2001 dot-com bubble crash in the US and the 2007–8 recent
global ﬁnancial crisis (see Table 2). Therefore, on the basis of the stan-
dard and nonlinear unit root tests, all variables can be treated as I(0) and
are entered into the threshold Taylor rule model in levels.
Fig. 3. The evolution of the real effective exchange rates.
Fig. 4. The evolution of output gaps.
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4.1. Linear Taylor rule results
The linear estimation results are reported in Table 3. We use the GMM
estimator with an optimal weighting matrix, which takes into account
possible serial correlation (Hansen, 1982). Following Clarida et al.6(1998) and Taylor and Davradakis (2006), a constant and the sixth, the
ninth and the twelfth lags of each variable in the regression models, i.e.,
the interest rate, inﬂation gap, output gap and real effective exchange
rate, are chosen as instruments. If their number and that of the orthog-
onality conditions exceed the number of estimated parameters, the
regression is over-identiﬁed. To investigate the validity of our in-
struments, we carry out Sargan tests, the null hypothesis being that the
Table 1
Linear unit root tests.
ADF Test PP Test KPSS Test
Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend
Indonesia rt 2.052 2.051 1.743 1.491 2.052*** 0.274***
πtþk 3.363** 3.363* 2.718* 2.746 0.273 0.092
rertþk 3.951*** 4.138*** 3.215** 2.567 1.819*** 0.320***
ytþk 11.656*** 11.622*** 11.814*** 11.815** 0.028 0.027
Israel rt 1.865- 3.324* 1.950 2.861 3.802*** 0.547***
πtþk 3.589*** 3.607** 3.036** 3.093 0.354* 0.121*
rertþk 2.008 1.591 1.774 1.515 1.422*** 0.837***
ytþk 4.919*** 4.907*** 6.418*** 6.418*** 0.042 0.042
South Korea rt 9.486*** 6.810*** 11.265*** 10.778*** 1.493*** 0.255***
πtþk 3.183** 3.165* 2.702* 2.692 0.379* 0.380***
rertþk 2.258 2.281 2.684* 2.653 0.469* 0.478***
ytþk 4.433*** 4.428*** 4.830*** 4.834*** 0.040 0.039
Thailand rt 2.088 2.072 1.721 1.656 0.311 0.281***
πtþk 3.009** 2.985 2.521 2.537 0.258 0.249***
rertþk 1.247 2.564 0.946 2.933 3.304*** 0.200**
ytþk 5.313*** 5.297** 5.392*** 5.390*** 0.031 0.030
Turkey rt 4.834*** 3.595** 5.245*** 3.413* 2.428*** 0.511***
πtþk 4.386*** 4.571*** 6.956*** 6.956*** 0.082 0.082
rertþk 2.857* 2.301 2.200 2.094 1.086*** 0.560***
ytþk 4.110*** 4.096*** 8.848*** 8.847*** 0.061* 0.060
Notes: rt, πtþk, rertþk, and ytþk denote the short-term policy rate, inﬂation gap, real effective exchange rate, and output gap, respectively. The lag length for the ADF test is
chosen based on the AIC criterion. The PP and KPSS tests are estimated on the basis of the Bartlett-kernel, using the Newey-West bandwidth (Newey and West, 1994).
The null hypothesis of the ADF and PP tests is that the series is nonstationary, while the null hypothesis is stationarity against the alternative of a unit root for the KPSS
test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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rejected at the 5% level in any case, which conﬁrms the exogeneity of the
instruments.
The coefﬁcients of the Taylor rule, on the other hand, differ across the
countries under investigation in terms of size, sign and statistical sig-
niﬁcance. More speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate
(α1) is highly signiﬁcant and close to one in all cases. This implies that the
monetary authorities of the countries under consideration adjust their
interest rate with the smoothing parameter. There is also evidence that
they respond to deviations of inﬂation from its target. The estimate of α2
is signiﬁcant and positive in all countries, except South Korea. Further,
they react to the output gap in Indonesia and Israel as the coefﬁcient α3 is
positive and signiﬁcant. In the case of Thailand, α3 is signiﬁcant as well
but negative (α3 ¼  0:015), whilst it is small and insigniﬁcant in South
Korea and Turkey. Finally, there is no evidence of any response to ex-
change rate movements in all countries, except Turkey (α4¼0.483).
Overall, our ﬁndings support the existence of a Taylor rule in
Indonesia, Israel, Thailand and Turkey, but not in South Korea, where the
coefﬁcients on both the output and inﬂation gaps are found to be sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. These results also suggest that policymakers in the
countries considered respond more to deviations from target in the case
of inﬂation as opposed to output. Next we examine whether there is any
evidence of nonlinearities.5 In the estimation of the threshold GMMwe use the RATS codes of Taylor and
Davradakis (2006). For more details on the steps of the Q-LR test, see Taylor and
Davradakis (2006).4.2. Threshold Taylor rule results
As emphasised in the recent literature, there are various reasons why
the reaction function of monetary authorities might not be linear: for
instance, if the weights on positive and negative output and inﬂation gaps
respectively are not the same, the behaviour of the central bank might be
better described by a nonlinear Taylor rule (see, e.g., Robert-Nobay and
Peel, 2003; Dolado et al., 2005; Taylor and Davradakis, 2006; Surico,
2007; Castro, 2011; Martin and Milas, 2004, 2013; Caglayan et al., 2016,
Klingelh€ofer and Sun, 2018).7As already mentioned, we use GMM to estimate the threshold model
given by Eq. (5) because this method takes into account the possible
correlation between the regressors; it is ideally suited to modelling the
possibly asymmetric behaviour of central banks since it treats regime
switches as endogenous, and it allows to estimate the optimal threshold
value of inﬂation for each country – this is chosen as the threshold in-
dicator since monetary policy typically places more weight on inﬂation
(Castro, 2011; Martin and Milas, 2013; Jawadi et al., 2014). The opti-
mum threshold values obtained from the grid search based on the min-
imisation of the condition given by Eq. (7) are reported in Table 4.
Turkey has the highest value (π* ¼ 8%Þ, followed by Indonesia
(π* ¼ 6%Þ: Israel and South Korea have the same (lower) value (π* ¼
3%Þ, while Thailand has the lowest one (π* ¼ 1%Þ. In order to compare
linear and threshold models in terms of goodness of ﬁt, following Taylor
and Davradakis (2006) we applied quasi likelihood ratio (Q  LR ) test
statistics as follows:
Q LR ¼ Jlin  Jthres; (8)
where Jlin and Jthres are the objective function that GMM minimizes for
the linear and threshold models respectively. Signiﬁcance levels of the Q-
LR statistics derived from a non-parametric bootstrap simulations based
on Hansen (1996) are reported at the bottom of Table 4. The results
conﬁrm the existence of threshold effects in all countries by rejecting the
null hypothesis of linear model, i.e. H0 : βL1 ¼ βH1 ; βL2 ¼ βH2 ; βL3 ¼ βH3 ;
βL4 ¼ βH4 .5 More speciﬁcally, Regime 1 is the high inﬂation regime
where the inﬂation rate exceeds its optimum threshold value πt1  π,
whilst regime 2 is the low inﬂation regime, where πt1 < π (see Fig. 5 for
the regime classiﬁcations). Therefore, the inﬂation rate appears to be the
Table 2
Nonlinear unit root tests.
Lee-Strazicich (LS) Test Lumsdaine Papell (LP) Test
Model A (Crash Model) Model C (Trend Shift Model) Breaks in Intercept Breaks in Trend Breaks in Intercept and Trend
LM-Stat Breakpoints LM-Stat λ1 λ2 Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints
D1t D1t DT1t DT2t D1t D2t D2t D2t DT1t DT2t
Indonesia rt -3.55** 2003:04
(-1.77)
2005:05
(0.318)
-4.61** 0.34 0.61 2005:05
(4.734)
2008:10
(-4.477)
-3.70 2003:01
(-3.040)
2005:03
(2.293)
-4.46 2004:01
(4.045)
2005:11
(-3.062)
-5.404 2003:11
(-0.9085)
(-4.720)
2006:06
(-4.720)
(-4.242)
πtþk -3.90*** 2004:01
(-1.884)
2005:06
(4.523)
-5.07*** 0.33 0.62 2005:03
(3.610)
2009:10
(-1.611)
-4.10 2005:03
(2.198)
2012:10
(1.804)
-4.45 2003:01
(2.863)
2005:08
(-2.677)
-5.475 2003:01
(-0.913)
(4.014)
2006:06
(-3.881)
(-3.624)
rertþk -2.45 2004:03
(1.602)
2007:01
(1.595)
-4.23** 0.21 0.71 2003:08
(-4.978)
2009:12
(0.548)
-7.87*** 2005:06
(7.207)
2009:04
(6.192)
-5.42 2009:01
(1.691)
2010:12
(-2.878)
-7.071
***
2005:06
(6.547)
(-0.183)
2009:04
(5.955)
(1.112)
ytþk -4.15*** 2005:02
(1.387)
2007:12
(1.612)
-7.74*** 0.29 0.42 2004:10
(6.757)
2006:05
(-5.502)
-12.27*** 2005:10
(-2.949)
2010:06
(-2.318)
-11.68*** 2004:08
(-1.272)
2006:06
(1.229)
-12.706
***
2005:10
(-4.017)
(-1.861)
2008:02
(-1.861)
(-3.316)
Israel rt -3.27** 2002:07
(-4.100)
2011:03
(1.235)
-4.86*** 0.30 0.44 2002:03
(4.054)
2004:07
(-3.442)
-5.09 1999:11
(-2.780)
2010:07
(2.220)
-4.58 2001:07
(2.305)
2009:03
(1.237)
-6.338 2002:05
(4.938)
(-2.512)
2005:02
(2.796)
(4.743)
πtþk -3.83*** 1999:10
(0.799)
2001:10
(1.216)
-6.20*** 0.27 0.61 2001:08
(3.403)
2007:05
(1.767)
-4.83 2001:09
(2.853)
2007:03
(3.023)
-4.17 2006:07
(1.285)
2009:01
(-1.865)
-5.150 2003:01
(-2.755)
(-0.027)
2007:03
(1.924)
(-2.228)
rertþk -2.37 2001:06
(0.835)
2007:02
(-2.876)
-5.10*** 0.26 0.63 2001:06
(-4.902)
2007:08
(7.021)
-4.59 2001:09
(-3.919)
2007:09
(2.499)
-4.78 2001:02
(-3.532)
2004:10
(4.401)
-4.565 2001:09
(-3.663)
(-3.129)
2007:04
(4.019)
(2.747)
ytþk -6.20*** 2001:04
(-0.523)
2008:01
(0.583)
-7.44*** 0.17 0.30 1999:12
(4.642)
2002:02
(-5.012)
-6.03* 2001:03
(-3.131)
2008:12
(-3.121)
-5.10 2000:07
(-1.414)
2003:01
(1.392)
-6.214 2000:01
(3.4098)
(-1.305)
2003:09
(2.705)
(3.512)
South
Korea
rt -1.12 2000:10
(-0.976)
2002:05
(-1.402)
-3.88 0.23 0.68 2001:10
(8.557)
2008:12
(0.671)
-7.34*** 2001:06
(-1.575)
2008:09
(-2.796)
-6.81** 2007:09
(-1.206)
2010:01
(0.995)
-7.421
***
2008:09
(-3.123)
(1.959)
2011:08
(-0.395)
(-2.181)
πtþk -2.94* 2001:01
(2.322)
2011:11
(-1.482)
-5.05*** 0.17 0.87 2000:09
(3.367)
2011:12
(-2.058)
-4.71 2000:07
(2.260)
2011:10
(-2.504)
-5.65 2000:09
(-4.050)
-2.4217
(2011:05)
-6.213 2001:06
(-1.592)
(-4.719)
2007:07
(3.178)
(-1.611)
rertþk -2.10 2007:12
(-0.016)
2009:10
(-1.426)
-5.58*** 0.65 0.77 2008:05
(-6.215)
2010:04
(4.489)
-6.02* 2004:07
(2.721)
2008:05
(-5.432)
-4.60 2006:12
(-4.166)
2009:04
(4.191)
-6.976
**
2005:09
(4.796)
(-4.847)
2008:05
(-5.178)
(4.798)
ytþk -5.13*** 2000:08
(-1.3899)
2009:08
(1.073)
-5.74*** 0.65 0.76 2008:07
(-2.075)
2010:04
(3.546)
-5.20 2000:10
(-1.982)
2008:08
(-2.643)
-4.89 2000:06
(-2.164)
2002:10
(1.496)
-6.523
*
2008:10
(-4.660)
(4.380)
2011:02
(-2.238)
(-4.348)
Lee-Strazicich (LS) Test, Lumsdaine Papell (LS) Test
Model A (Crash Model) Model C (Trend Shift Model) Breaks in Intercept Breaks in Trend Breaks in Intercept and Trend
LM-Stat Breakpoints LM-Stat λ1 λ2 Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints
D1t D2t DT1t DT2t D1t D2t D2t D2t DT1t DT2t
Thailand rt -3.29** 2007:04
(-0.047)
2011:11
(-2.1981)
-4.52** 0.41 0.73 2005:06
(2.549)
2009:06
(-0.347)
-4.46 2005:03
(2.889)
2008:09
(-3.398)
-3.35 2006:11
(-2.819)
2009:02
(2.216)
-5.10 2005:08
(3.752)
(-4.572)
2010:11
(4.372)
(2.204)
πtþk -2.52 2002:10
(-0.347)
2009:10
(-1.807)
-6.88*** 0.30 0.64 2005:09
(-0.748)
2010:08
(5.177)
-5.59* 2008:04
(-4.744)
2012:11
(-4.274)
-4.97 2005:07
(-3.100)
2013:05
(-2.008)
-6.70* 2008:04
(-5.746)
(0.413)
2012:08
(-0.393)
(-4.240)
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued )
Lee-Strazicich (LS) Test, Lumsdaine Papell (LS) Test
Model A (Crash Model) Model C (Trend Shift Model) Breaks in Intercept Breaks in Trend Breaks in Intercept and Trend
LM-Stat Breakpoints LM-Stat λ1 λ2 Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints t-stat Breakpoints
D1t D2t DT1t DT2t D1t D2t D2t D2t DT1t DT2t
rertþk -3.22** 2004:10
(0.375)
2013:03
(-0.379)
-5.94*** 0.19 0.36 2004:02
(2.117)
2006:06
(2.958)
-4.73 2005:11
(4.049)
2009:11
(1.760)
-4.91 2005:01
(3.908)
2007:02
(-4.263)
-5.85 2004:11
(-1.826)
(5.039)
2008:02
(-4.531)
(-4.996)
ytþk -6.13*** 2003:08
(0.572)
2011:02
(1.824)
-7.54*** 0.72 0.88 2011:09
(7.061)
2013:10
(-6.013)
-5.78 2008:08
(-1.935)
2012:01
(1.221)
-5.32 2007:02
(-0.733)
2009:03
(0.763)
-6.59 2008:10
(-3.742)
(3.370)
2010:11
(-2.268)
(-3.285)
Turkey rt -1.07 2006:07
(-1.383)
2011:07
(4.954)
-3.65 0.24 0.69 2005:01
(6.892)
2010:10
(-0.121)
-4.34 2011:07
(1.653)
2013:11
(1.784)
-3.83 2004:01
(2.072)
2011:01
(2.263)
-4.81 2004:08
(-1.111)
(3.494)
2008:12
(-4.328)
(-0.332)
πtþk -0.86 2009:12
(3.576)
2013:03
(1.665)
-6.27*** 0.18 0.56 2004:03
(8.110)
2008:12
(-3.085)
-7.97*** 2005:12
(4.388)
2008:12
(-5.034)
-6.41* 2008:04
(-4.207)
2010:04
(3.643)
-7.80*** 2005:12
(3.982)
(1.823)
2008:12
(-4.977)
(-0.399)
rertþk -4.11*** 2008:02
(2.105)
2010:10
(-0.687)
-6.61*** 0.47 0.64 2007:11
(-1.161)
2009:12
(4.203)
-5.40 2004:08
(3.939)
2006:08
(3.704)
-5.72 2007:10
(-3.752)
2010:08
(-2.247)
-6.47 2008:07
(-3.399)
(-1.841)
2011:02
(-2.113)
(-3.240)
ytþk -4.23
***
2008:01
(2.642)
2009:12
(-2.093)
-5.87 0.31 0.52 2005:12
(4.977)
2008:08
(-5.279)
-5.44 2008:07
(-3.327)
2010:05
(1.941)
-4.45 2007:06
(-1.633)
2009:04
(1.796)
-7.84*** 2008:11
(-6.401)
(5.082)
2010:09
(-0.151)
(-5.452)
Notes: rt, πtþk, rertþk, and ytþk denote the short-term policy rate, inﬂation gap, real effective exchange rate, and output gap, respectively. The general to speciﬁc procedure is followed to ﬁnd the optimum lag length, allowing
for a maximum of 12 lags. The t-statistics are represented in parentheses (.). The critical values are obtained from Lee and Strazicich (2003). Model A allows for breaks in the intercept, whereas Model C allows for breaks in
both the intercept and the trend. D1t and D2t refer to the ﬁrst and second break dates, while DT1t and DT2t indicate the ﬁrst and second break dates when allowing for the trend. λ1 and λ2 are the locations of the ﬁrst and
second breakpoints, respectively (λ ¼Dt/T for Model A and λ ¼DTt/T for Model C, where T is the sample size). LM-Stat is the Lagrange Multiplier unit root test, reported by Schmidt and Phillips (1992). ***, ** and *
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3
Linear Taylor rule based on GMM.
Indonesia Israel South
Korea
Thailand Turkey
α0 0.914
(0.792)
0.131
(0.729)
0.148
(0.240)
0.344
(0.354)
2.289***
(0.922)
α1 0.952***
(0.006)
0.981***
(0.004)
1.003***
(0.004)
0.985***
(0.006)
0.977***
(0.002)
α2 0.058***
(0.004)
0.036***
(0.006)
0.004
(0.004)
0.026***
(0.004)
0.082***
(0.006)
α3 0.026***
(0.006)
0.012*
(0.007)
0.002
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
α4 0.258
(0.171)
0.022
(0.160)
0.032
(0.052)
0.070
(0.078)
0.483***
(0.203)
Sargan
Test
50.35
[0.236]
53.18
[0.161]
52.38
[0.181]
56.56
[0.096]
41.58
[0.575]
Notes: The estimated model is speciﬁed as.
rt¼α0þα1rt1þα2
X3
k¼1
ðEt1πtþkπtÞþα3
X3
k¼1
ðEt1ytþkÞþα4
X3
k¼1
ðEt1rertþkÞþεt;
where rt, πtþk, rertþk, and ytþk denote the short-term policy rate, inﬂation gap,
real effective exchange rate, and output gap, respectively, while πt is the inﬂation
target. Standard errors are represented in parentheses (.). The probabilities of the
Sargan test statistics are given in square brackets [.]. The set of instruments in-
cludes a constant and the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth lags of each variable in
the estimated model. The horizons of the real effective exchange rate, and output
and inﬂation gaps are, respectively, the 3-month lead average of the real ex-
change rate, and output and inﬂation gaps (Svensson, 1997; Martin and Milas,
2013; Ahmad, 2016). ***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively
Table 4
Nonlinear (threshold) Taylor rule based on GMM.
Indonesia Israel South
Korea
Thailand Turkey
π* 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08
Panel A: Regime 1 (high inﬂation)
βH0 0.872
(1.637)
8.574
(7.028)
1.761
(1.283)
1.027
(0.786)
2.031
(1.377)
βH1 0.979***
(0.005)
0.998***
(0.012)
0.984***
(0.017)
0.982***
(0.008)
0.992***
(0.005)
βH2 0.050***
(0.006)
0.056***
(0.017)
0.070***
(0.028)
0.0604***
(0.011)
0.006
(0.021)
βH3 0.053***
(0.011)
0.041***
(0.014)
0.006
(0.005)
0.021***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
βH4 0.186
(0.367)
1.837
(1.537)
0.377
(0.278)
0.232
(0.173)
0.431
(0.295)
Panel B: Regime 2 (low inﬂation)
βL0 8.759***
(4.084)
3.596***
(2.068)
0.886***
(0.402)
5.554
(3.539)
4.414
(3.041)
βL1 0.891***
(0.053)
0.981***
(0.009)
0.927***
(0.010)
0.575***
(0.204)
0.994***
(0.005)
βL2 0.021
(0.023)
0.120***
(0.027)
0.041***
(0.008)
0.138***
(0.073)
0.057***
(0.011)
βL3 0.014
(0.016)
0.009
(0.011)
0.016***
(0.004)
0.015
(0.014)
0.046***
(0.008)
βL4 2.063***
(0.851)
0.756***
(0.451)
0.248***
(0.248)
1.467***
(0.842)
1.012
(0.677)
Sargan
Test
37.74
[0.527]
33.20
[0.731]
42.88
[0.181]
33.37
[0.723]
31.68
[0.791]
Q-LR [0.03080] [0.03400] [0.02140] [0.01500] [0.02720]
Notes: The estimated model is speciﬁed as.
rt ¼ I

πt1
 π* "βH0 þ βH1 rt1 þ βH2 X3
k¼1
ðEt1πtþk  πtÞ þ βH3
X3
k¼1
ðEt1ytþkÞ þ βH4

X3
k¼1
ðEt1rertþkÞ
#
þ nflation rate ðcalculated as a Iπt1
< π*
"
βL0 þ βL1rt1 þ βL2
X3
k¼1
ðEt1πtþk s g inflation rate;πtÞ þ βL3

X3
k¼1
ðEt1ytþkÞ þ βL4
X3
k¼1
ðEt1rertþkÞ
#
þ εt;
where rt, πtþk, rertþk, and ytþk denote the short-term policy rate, inﬂation gap,
real effective exchange rate, and output gap, respectively, while πt is the inﬂation
target. Standard errors are represented in parentheses (.). The probabilities of the
Sargan and Q-LR linearity tests are given in square brackets [.].π refers to the
optimal threshold value for inﬂation. Regime 1 (high inﬂation regime) is where
inﬂation rate exceeds its optimum threshold value πt1  π, while regime 2 (low
inﬂation regime) is where inﬂation rate is below its optimum threshold value
πt1  π. The set of instruments includes a constant and the sixth, the ninth and
the twelfth lags of each variable in the estimated model. The horizons of the real
effective exchange rate, and output and inﬂation gaps are, respectively, the 3-
month lead average of the real exchange rate, and inﬂation and output gaps
(Svensson, 1997; Martin and Milas, 2013; Ahmad, 2016). ***, ** and * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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in Appendix A gives details of the identiﬁed regimes for each country.
The estimation results for the nonlinear Taylor rule are reported in
Table 4. The interest rate smoothing coefﬁcient is close to unity in both
regimes in all countries, except in Thailand in the low inﬂation regime
(βL1 ¼ 0:575). This conﬁrms the smoothness in interest rate adjustment
by the monetary authorities for the countries in our sample. There is clear
evidence that monetary authorities react to the inﬂation gap in a
nonlinear manner. The coefﬁcient on the inﬂation gap is positive and
signiﬁcant in Israel, South Korea and Thailand in both regimes, but its
size is not the same in the two regimes (see βL2 and β
H
2 in Table 4). In
Indonesia, it is only positive and signiﬁcant when the inﬂation rate ex-
ceeds its target level, whilst in Turkey it is signiﬁcant and positive in the
low inﬂation regime only. The evidence for Turkey suggests that the
interest rate channel of monetary transmission may work properly only
in a low-inﬂation environment as previously documented by Çatık and
Karaçuka (2012).
The coefﬁcient on the output gap is positive and signiﬁcant in
Indonesia and Israel (but negative and signiﬁcant in Thailand) in the high
inﬂation regime, and in South Korea and Turkey in the low inﬂation one.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with those of other empirical studies ﬁnding
that a contractionary monetary policy has a negative impact on output
(Mallick and Sousa, 2012; Jawadi et al., 2014). Finally, the estimated
coefﬁcient on the real effective exchange rate implies that the central
bank reacts to its ﬂuctuations only in the low inﬂation regime (βL4 is
positive and signiﬁcant in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand and
negative and signiﬁcant in Israel). It seems therefore that the real effec-
tive exchange rate has an important role in determining the behaviour of
central banks in emerging markets in the low inﬂation regime. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the literature suggesting that emerging markets
have an implicit comfort zone for smoothing exchange rate ﬂuctuations,
even if they do not specify an exchange rate target (see also Ghosh et al.,
2016; de la Torre et al., 2013; Mohanty, 2013).10To sum up, the results discussed above suggest that a nonlinear Taylor
rule captures monetary policy in the countries under consideration better
than a linear one; speciﬁcally, the reaction of monetary authorities to
deviations from target of either the inﬂation or the output gap varies in
terms of magnitude and/or statistical signiﬁcance across the two inﬂa-
tion regimes in all countries. These ﬁndings are broadly in line with those
of Miles and Schreyer (2012), who found that the central bank in
Thailand responds aggressively to the deviation of inﬂation from target
using quantile regression analysis with four different quantiles. The
Fig. 5. Regime classiﬁcations based on inﬂation. Notes: the upper regime, the shaded areas, represents the high inﬂation regime where inﬂation rate exceeds its
optimum threshold value πt1  π*. These optimum threshold values are respectively, πt1  6%, πt1  3%, πt1  3%, πt1  1%, and πt1  8% for Indonesia,
South Korea, Israel, Thailand, and Turkey which are obtained from the grid search based on the minimisation condition in Eq. (7).
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was not apparent in the context of the linear model: monetary authorities
are now shown to respond to its movements (in the low inﬂation regime)
in all countries in our sample except Turkey. In other words, monetary
policy in these emerging countries can be described by an augmented
nonlinear Taylor rule including the exchange rate. One possible expla-
nation for the greater weight on the exchange rate in the low regime is
that there is a tendency of policy makers to pursue other objectives when
the inﬂation rate undershoots the target and rely also on the exchange
rate channel for stabilising the economy (Akdogan, 2015).
5. Conclusions
This paper has examined the interest rate setting behaviour of
monetary authorities in ﬁve emerging countries (Indonesia, Israel,
South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey) that have adopted inﬂation tar-
geting. In addition to the basic linear Taylor rule, an augmented one
including the exchange rate has also been considered, given the fact that
monetary authorities in these countries frequently intervene in the
foreign exchange markets when there are large deviations from target or
to smooth out volatility (Daude et al., 2016). The pass-through from
exchange rates to import and consumer prices in the emerging markets
is well documented (see e.g., Ca’Zorzi et al., 2007). In the case of a
depreciation side, it may force central banks targeting price stability to
tighten their monetary policy, while it might lead to loss of11international competition in the case of an appreciation (Gagnon and
Ihrig, 2004; Baily, 2003; Bailliu and Fujii, 2004; Ghosh et al., 2016).
Further, a nonlinear speciﬁcation has been estimated using GMM to
allow for possible asymmetries, following recent empirical studies (see
Favero et al., 2000, Taylor and Davradakis, 2006; Surico, 2007;
Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2008; Castro, 2011; Martin and Milas, 2004,
2013; Ahmad, 2016, among others).
The empirical ﬁndings can be summarised as follows. First, a
nonlinear Taylor rule best describes the behaviour of interest rate setting
in the analysed emerging markets. In particular, monetary authorities in
all countries in our sample respond to deviations of inﬂation from target
in the high inﬂation regime (except for Turkey) as well as in the low
inﬂation one (except Indonesia); however, their response to deviations of
output from its long-run level is only found to be signiﬁcant in the high
inﬂation regime in Indonesia and Israel and in the low inﬂation one in
South Korea and Turkey. Second, monetary authorities in these econo-
mies respond not only to deviations of inﬂation and output from target
but also to movements in the real exchange rate (but only when inﬂation
is below target), except for Turkey. Cross-country differences in mone-
tary policy responses can be rationalised in terms of economic perfor-
mance, the degree of ﬁnancial liberalisation, vulnerability to external
shocks, and ﬁnancial contagion across countries. Future research could
include in the model a measure of the ﬁnancial condition of countries or a
stress index as the threshold variable.
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Table A1
Description of the data.
Interest Inﬂation rate Inﬂation expectations Exchange Production
rate12rateIndonesia
(2001:01–2014:11)Deﬁnition Discount rate
(end of period)CPI Inﬂation
targetReal effective exchange rate
(2010¼ 100)Production in total
manufacturing index
(2010¼ 100)Conversion Level The 3-month leading average of the
inﬂation rate (calculated as
percentage changes from the CPI)Level The 3-month leading
average of the log real
effective exchange rate3-month lead average of
the output gap.Data
SourceIMF FRED Bank
IndonesiaFRED FREDIsrael (1997:06–2015:02) Deﬁnition Discount rate
(end of period)CPI Inﬂation
targetReal effective exchange rate
(2010¼ 100)Industrial production
indexConversion Level The 3-month leading average of the
inﬂation rate (calculated as
percentage changes from the CPI)Level The 3-month leading
average of the log real
effective exchange rate3-month lead average of
the output gap.Data
SourceIMF FRED Bank of
IsraelFRED IMFSouth
Korea(1998:01–2015:03)Deﬁnition Discount rate
(end of period)CPI Inﬂation
targetReal effective exchange rate
(2010¼ 100)Industrial production
indexConversion Level The 3-month leading average of the
inﬂation rate (calculated as
percentage changes from the CPI)Level The 3-month leading
average of the log real
effective exchange rate3-month lead average of
the output gap.Data
SourceIMF FRED Bank of
KoreaFRED IMFThailand(2000:05–2015:09) Deﬁnition Discount rate
(end of period)CPI Inﬂation
targetReal effective exchange rate
(2010¼ 100)Industrial production
indexConversion Level The 3-month leading average of the
inﬂation rate (calculated as
percentage changes from the CPI)Level The 3-month leading
average of the log real
effective exchange rate3-month lead average of
the output gap.Data
SourceIMF IMF Bank of
ThailandFRED IMFTurkey(2006:01–2015:09) Deﬁnition Discount rate
(end of period)CPI Inﬂation
targetReal effective exchange rate
(2010¼ 100)Industrial production
indexConversion Level The 3-month leading average of the
inﬂation rate (calculated as
percentage changes from the CPI)Level The 3-month leading
average of the log real
effective exchange rate3-month lead average of
the output gap.Data
SourceIMF IMF CBRT FRED IMFNote: FRED is the Federal Reserve Economic Data and CBRT is the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.Table A2
Regime classiﬁcations.
Regime 1 (high inﬂation) Regime 2 (low inﬂation)Indonesia (2001:01–2014:11) 2001:01–2003:08 2003:09–2004:02
2004:03–2007:03 2007:04
2007:05–2009:01 2009:02–2010:05
2010:06 2010:07–2010:08
2010:09–2011:02 2011:03–2013:03
2013:04–2014:04 2014:05–2014:08Israel (1997:06–2015:02) 1997:01–1999:08 1999:09–2001:11
2001:12–2003:02 2003:03–2005:11
2005:12–2006:04 2006:05–2007:09
2007:10–2009:06 2009:7
2009:08–2010:02 2010:03–2010:10
2010:11–2011:07 2011:08–2014:11South Korea (1998:01–2015:03) 1998:01–1998:10 1998:11–2000:10
2000:11–2001:10 2001:11–2002:07
2002:08–2005:02 2005:03–2007:08
2007:09–2009:02 2009:03–2009:10
2009:11 2009:12–2010:06
2010:07–2011:12 2012:01–2014:12Thailand (2000:05–2015:09) 2000:05–2001:08 2001:09–2002:07
2002-08-2008:09 2008:10–2009:08
2009:09–2014:09 2014:10–2015:06Turkey (2006:01–2015:09) 2006:01–2007:04 2007:05–2007:08(continued on next page)
G.M. Caporale et al. Economic Modelling xxx (2017) 1–14Table A2 (continued )Regime 1 (high inﬂation)13Regime 2 (low inﬂation)2007:09–2008:12 2009:01–2009:10
2009:11–2010:08 2010:09–2011:08
2011:09–2012:07 2012:08–2013:04
2013:05–2013:06 2013:07–2013:11
2013:12–2014:10 2014:11–2015:06Note: Regime 1 is the high inﬂation regime where the inﬂation rate exceeds its optimum threshold value πt1  π*,
whilst regime 2 is the low inﬂation regime, where.πt1 < π*:References
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